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India presents the student of police systems with many interesting features for 
analysis. The country is vast, the population is large and diverse in race, religion 
and language. Moreover, as a developing country, India has the ever-present 
problem of inadequate resources to cope with all the political, economic and 
racial problems. Therefore, India presents a picture of a society where the 
potential for internal conflict is ever-present. D.H. Bayley has suggested, 
". . . that the tenuousness of social peace in India is one of the foremost factors 
conditioning police activity."1 He further argues that, "Were it not for the 
prevalence of violence, there would be no reason to maintain from two-fifths to 
one-half of all police as quasi soldiers not engaged in ordinary police work but 
saved for law and order operations."2 
This article will examine aspects of the post-independence development of the 
Indian police system. The discussion of the police system will be related to 
general political, economic and social developments, it will also be related to 
recent internal conflicts that have brought the Indian police into the news in the 
West with headlines such as: "Desai disbands police to quell mutiny" {Daily 
Telegraph, 27 June 1979); "Mrs. Gandhi accuses police in Assam" {The Times, 
2 July 1980) and "Bihar police strike threat" {The Times, 4 Dec. 1980). The 
particular aspects of policing in India that will be considered are the legacy of 
the imperial police service, the impact of modernization in India, and the growth 
of centrally organized police forces. 
What do the Indian police have to contend with in terms of internal troubles? 
David Bayley identifies three broad categories of what he calls "public 
violence."1 These are the violence of remonstrance — which aims to bring a 
problem to the attention of government; the violence of confrontation — 
conflict between groups in the community, and the violence of frustration — eg. 
student riots or a riot over lack of supplies in a government fair price shop. 
Recent examples of these forms of "public violence" can readily be cited. The 
major riots and disturbances in the north-eastern states of Assam and Tripura 
are examples of the violence of remonstrance. The native populations of both 
states are protesting about the high levels of entry of Nepalese and Bengali 
immigrants and refugees from Bangladesh. In Tripura in June 1980 six days of 
fighting left at least 300 dead and 50,000 homeless, according to official figures.4 
The riots between Hindus and Muslims in the northern city or Moradabad in 
August 1980 provide an example of the violence of confrontation between 
different groups in the community. In these riots mobs attacked police stations 
and there were reports of armed gangs capturing policemen.5 An unusual 
example of the violence of frustration is the demonstrations in the state of Bihar 
in support of the local police, who it was admitted had unlawfully wounded 
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prisoners. In the rather backward state of Bihar some sections of the community 
apparently welcomed the exercise of violence against suspected criminals as an 
appropriate way of dealing with a high crime rate.'' 
What sort of police system did India inherit from the period of British rule? 
The basis for police operations and organization is still the British 1861 Police 
Act for India and therefore, as Dr. Acharya notes, "Contemporary Police 
philosophy in India is an ironic combination of British liberal tradition and 
British colonial practice."7 The police were subordinate to the rule of law but not 
citizens in uniform like the British constable. The police in India were modelled 
on the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) rather than Sir Robert Peel's English 
"New Police". The RIC was a force designed to maintain the rule of an alien 
polity and thus an appropriate model for other colonial police forces. Therefore 
the Indian police became associated, especially during the twentieth century 
independence struggles, with the machinery of British "oppression". Under the 
British Indian police system the police were a decentralized body of state and 
city forces. They were, in broad terms, divided into the unarmed or civil police 
who were responsible for all ordinary police duties, and the armed police who 
could be used in the suppression of public order problems. During World War II 
the British authorities established a centrally controlled and organized police 
public order force, the Crown Representatives' Police (CRP) Force. This force 
was to assist the police and army to maintain internal order because of the 
strains of war and the internal unrest caused by the freedom movement. 
When independence was achieved the new Indian government made no 
fundamental change to the imperial policing system. Under the constitution and 
by the inherited body of laws the police function remained decentralized and the 
responsibility of the state governments but the Union government provided 
certain important police services and retained the ability to raise national 
reserve police forces. The most notable service is the All-Union cadre of senior 
police officers, the Indian Police Service. This cadre, which is centrally recruited 
and trained, provides all states with a high proportion of officers in the mana-
gerial ranks of Assistant Superintendent to Director-General. 
Before analysing the problems of policing in contemporary India it is neces-
sary to outline the scale of the country and population size problem in relation to 
the police. India has a population of about 600 million and a total police 
strength in the States of almost 762,000.8 This gives a police-to-population ratio 
of approximately 1:1000 (by comparison the approximate ratios for the UK are 
1:470 and the USA 1:230). Of the total police strength about 580,000 are civil or 
unarmed police and about 178,000 are armed police. The armed police total has 
to be augmented by the totals for the principal police reserve forces maintained 
by the Union Government, the CRP (66,548 in 1977) and the Border Security 
Force (BSF — raised in 1965) (74,100 in 1977). Therefore, depending on exactly 
which paramilitary police forces are counted with the state armed police, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies' figure of 300,000 for the total of 
paramilitary forces in India would seem approximately correct. 
These figures have to be put into perspective by relating them to the size and 
condition of the country. The basic police administrative unit is the station com-
manded by a Sub-Inspector; in rural areas the station may cover 160 square km. 
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and contain 75,000 people. The Sub-Inspector is one of the non-gazetted ranks 
(NCO equivalent) and he may not have a very high level of education. However, 
he is the key officer for the public as he and his station staff will be in most 
immediate contact with the public. Dr. K.V. Rao has described the Sub-In-
spector as the ". . . key-stone of the police arch . . .'"' 
Efficient policing, defined here as the ability to prevent crime, apprehend 
criminals and maintain order with available resources, will in practice vary con-
siderably from area to area. In some regions natural factors such as climate and 
geography can greatly hinder police work, geographic factors being a special 
hindrance where the Dacoits or bandits operate. In other areas, like the states of 
Bihar and Orissa which are relatively underdeveloped and have caste problems, 
there is likely to be more conflict and hence a more repressive form of policing. 
By contrast in states which have been under left-wing party control like Kerala 
and West Bengal, the state governments have tended to use their police more 
like semi-social workers. In states where there is a high level of persistent public 
order problems ordinary police work may have to give way to a concentration 
on public order maintenance. During the period of Mrs. Gandhi's Emergency 
Rule thirteen states each had over 20 companies of BSF and CRP deployed to 
their territories.10 
In order to understand why there may be mutinies or unrest in Indian police 
units it is necessary to consider not only the duties the police have to perform but 
also the fact that the police themselves are affected by India's political, eco-
nomic and social development. In essence many of the frustrations in the Indian 
police can be related to the national problem of scarce resources. Ideally, India 
needs an overall increase in police manpower and higher pay and a generally 
better educated and trained police force. In 1979 the average wage for a con-
stable in state forces was £20-£30 per month and it was reported that in one state 
it cost more to feed a police dog per month than a policeman received in pay." 
In fact the Union and state governments have increased expenditure on the 
police since independence; in 1950-51 India spent Rs (Rupees) 30m on the police 
while in 1974 the figure was Rs 1,564m.'2 However much of the expenditure for 
the Union has gone on raising more reserve police units or special duty police 
units (like CISF — Central Industrial Security Force). In the states additional 
expenditure has sometimes been spent on increasing the size of the armed police 
as a means of easing unemployment. 
The process of modernization in India has had a number of effects upon polic-
ing in India. In general the development of better communications means that 
more areas are open to continuous policing which in turn means a need for more 
police. Increased urbanization means that more police are needed in the cities. 
For example, a few years ago New Delhi needed only two District Superinten-
dents; now it has 2 senior Superintendents and four District Superintendents. 
The development process has also eroded a key feature of the traditional rela-
tionship between the district civil administrative officer and the district police 
superintendent. Under the system of British imperial rule the two senior officials 
in a district were the District Magistrate or Collector and the District Superin-
tendent of Police. The magistrate, as the chief administrative officer of the 
district, exercised a general form of control over the police in his district." After 
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independence this system continued but gradually the degree of control exer-
cised by the Magistrate over the district police began to decline. In part this was 
because the District Superintendent has become much more of a professional 
policeman and therefore more capable of handling all police matters. In part the 
decline in the Magistrates' exercise of the role of police supervisor is due to the 
Magistrate as an administrative official, becoming more a district development 
officer, concerned with economic and social problems. Therefore the Magis-
trates may seek to avoid too close an identification with law and order issues, 
except where major crises make this impossible. 
If the civil administrators as well as local and national politicians seek to 
avoid close identification with the necessary exercise of repressive police powers 
in times of serious internal troubles, then this leaves the police officer in an 
exposed position when trying to maintain law and order.14 If senior police 
officers feel that firm action will only lead to a commission of inquiry they may 
prefer to avoid taking action until a very serious situation develops.15 
A particular aspect of the modernization process in India that has an impor-
tant effect on public order maintenance by the police is the rise in educational 
standards. Because of increased educational opportunities and the unemploy-
ment problem the recent recruits to all grades of police entry tend to have more 
than the minimum educational qualifications. This has meant that although the 
states still maintain functionally and locationally separate armed and civil police 
branches it is not always easy to maintain the numbers in the armed police who 
have a more restricted police role. In the past recruits to the armed police 
needed even less educational qualifications than the limited requirements for 
civil police constables. The better educated recruits who have to join the armed 
police may become frustrated with its restricted role and seek transfers to the 
civil police. 
A number of writers have questioned why a country like India, which pro-
fesses to be a democracy, needs so many central reserve police forces."' One 
difficulty with analysing this point is that Mrs. Gandhi has begun to question the 
form democracy should take in India, and here one may note the controversy 
that surrounded her period of Emergency Rule.17 A charismatic leader-figure 
like Mrs. Gandhi, may feel that India's salvation lies in unquestioned support by 
the population for the central power.18 Putting such a view of politics into 
practice could require a strong police force to contain expressions of opposition. 
The development of Indian para-military police forces has been exhaustively 
analysed by K.P. Misra and his conclusions seem to be well founded on the 
evidence available. Misra, whilst aware of the possibility that India could 
succumb to authoritarian rule, argues that, for the moment ". . . the para-
military forces have acted as a supporting cast in a drama (India's internal 
conflicts) in which the main actors are the police forces of the several states or 
the army. The para-military forces . .. insulate the military from direct interven-
tion in domestic disorder and permit it to concentrate upon external defence; 
they also stiffen the backbone of local police forces . . ,"19 Misra notes that the 
use of para-military police forces can be abused but that in India such abuses 
can be corrected. 
The point about avoiding too much military involvement in internal affairs is 
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very important in the Indian context. The formation of the heavily-equipped 
Border Security Force stemmed, in part, from central government policy to give 
a high level of public order control capacity to the police. Despite its title the 
BSF has few border patrol duties. Most of the BSF is stationed around New 
Delhi and the rest of the BSF is divided between four regional commands, 
North, South, East and West India, each under the command of senior 
Inspectors-General of Police. It is hoped, in India, that this powerful police 
public order capacity will avoid the sort of serious general breakdowns of public 
order that have often been the excuse for military intervention and eventually 
military rule in Third World states. The example of Pakistan is a constant 
reminder to India of what can happen in those circumstances. 
If the police reserve units are maintained for such laudable aims why were 
there reports of mutinies in CRP companies in 1979? Part of the answer can be 
found in frustrations over pay and conditions similar to the frustrations in state 
forces. The other part of the answer derives from the length of some of the 
deployments of CRP companies. Ideally reserve police units should only be 
used for what they are trained, that is, to be brought out of barracks as a fresh, 
disciplined, well-equipped supplement to the local police for short periods of 
public order maintenance. If, as has happened in India, reserve companies are 
kept deployed for too long out of barracks they become involved in the more 
long-term and routine forms of police work and this is a task for which they 
were not designed. 
As in all societies today there are no easy answers to the police response to 
internal conflicts. Governments will try to govern and, hopefully, people can be 
assured of certain minimum rights in times of internal crisis.20 The familiar 
police request for more men and more pay is as appropriate to India as any 
other country. In this context Indian governments have a "chicken and egg" 
dilemma. Do they put resources into a larger and better paid police force which 
may be more able to control internal conflict, the "symptoms" approach? Or do 
they put resources into economic and social development, the "causes" 
approach? In practice, of course, the governments will have to try and do both 
because economic and social miracles will not happen quickly enough to satisfy 
the needs of all the population; internal conflicts will continue. One useful 
measure that has been contemplated but not enacted is the introduction of a new 
Police Act for India. Such a measure could preserve the best of the imperial 
system, the policeman as the servant of the law, whilst more explicitly relating 
the police to modern Indian society by stressing the concept of the police as a 
service — rather than the imperial concept of the police as a government force. 
As one Indian police writer has well noted, "The reputation of our police for 
fairness and impartiality can only be established when the people of this country 
(India) confidently expect the police to enforce the law without distinction of 
social or religious class or political party."21 General public confidence in the 
police in India will not be easily attained or maintained but it will be worth striv-
ing for in a country with so many intractable problems. 
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AVERTING ARMAGEDDON 
by 
David Levy 
Some important names in the Canadian political establishment have recently 
spoken out in favour of a special government Peace Tax Fund. In letters to 
newspapers,2 Senator Eugene Forsey and MPs Pauline Jewett, Stanley 
Knowles, Vic Althouse, Jim Manley, Bob Ogle and Svend Robinson have 
condemned defence spending as immoral and proposed that like-minded citizens 
be permitted to elect that an appropriate proportion of their taxes be diverted 
from arms to "a special government Peace Tax Fund, to be used for peace 
research, peace education, peacekeeping, peacemaking, development and other 
constructive uses.'" 
No one can quarrel with the principle. What I find disturbing is the assump-
tion that seems to underlie the proposal — that the entire blame for the present 
dire threat of global nuclear destruction rests in the West. For me, the idea of a 
Peace Tax Fund will become a serious and constructive effort to avert nuclear 
armageddon only if the Kremlin's iniquities are brought into the same sharp 
focus as those of the Pentagon. Without such a balance, the public outcry 
against the nuclear arms build-up seems to me just so much hot air and therefore 
a thorough waste of precious time. 
This spring, a Vancouver newspaper4 did signal service in the cause of peace 
research by publishing "a glimpse of Armageddon" by Vancouver physician 
Michael Scott, from a West Coast medical symposium on the effects of nuclear 
war. The shattering realities presented by Dr. Scott pointed to the probability, 
now upon us, that our planet will "flame out like a cosmic flash bulb" at the 
present rate of nuclear arms growth. 
What struck me most about the Scott article, however, was the realization 
that no such frank discussion of nuclear realities could appear in Soviet news-
papers. The pressure for nuclear disarmament is lop-sided, having effect in the 
West but not in the Soviet Union. This is the substance of my article. 
What is needed to halt the dangerous nuclear build-up is some real dialogue 
with the Russians — not the dialogue that merely offers them a platform for 
their dreary, self-righteous propaganda; not mindless monologue but meaning-
ful dialogue. And by meaningful I mean public dialogue. Not for nothing does 
Andrei Sakharov, "the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb" now totally at odds 
24 
